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In this appendix we consider potential sources of unobserved heterogeneity in our em-
pirical analysis. While we cannot provide an omnibus solution to this problem, we consider
various possible unobserved regional factors shaping institutional choice.
1. Differences in the law across states due to “when states entered the union” or to
“former Spanish heritage”. Figure 1 below plots the estimates of bias and quality of
information (the state averages) as a function of the date in which the state entered
the Union. Figure 2 presents the estimates of bias and quality of information for states
of hispanic heritage and of non-hispanic heritage. We included five states as having
hispanic heritage: Arizona, California, Florida, New Mexico and Texas. In neither
figure do we see any systematic differences in estimated bias and quality between
states based on their date of entry to the union, or their hispanic heritage.
2. Differences on “which cases are subject to mandatory [vs discretionary] review” across
states. The first point to note here is that all states have mandatory review in
death penalty cases, which we distinguish in our main specification. More generally,
states differ in whether they have mandatory or discretionary review for different
kind of cases. Table 1 below shows this information for each state.1 The table
distinguishes between mandatory review of criminal appeals, discretionary review of
criminal appeals, and an intermediate (mixed) category. Using this information, we
evaluate two considerations.
1This information can be obtained in the “State Court Organization 2004” report by the Bureau of
Justice Statistics, which is available online.
The first is whether states with different electoral institutions tend to have different
type of review (this is a necessary condition for the argument to go forward). This
information is presented in in the upper panel of Figure 3. This shows that states
in which justices are elected, face voter retention, or are appointed for life are evenly
split between mandatory, discretionary and mixed review systems. In other words,
conditioning on the state electing its Supreme Court justices, it is equally likely to
have mandatory or discretionary review. The same is true for systems with Voter
Retention, or Life appointments. The only exception is in the case of states in which
justices face political reappointment, which typically have mandatory review (six out
of eight cases).
The second and more important consideration is whether there is some relationship
between type of review and our estimates of bias and quality of information. The
lower panel of Figure 3 shows these estimates (the state-level averages) distinguishing
between type of review. The figure suggests that there is no systematic pattern
between type of review and our estimates of bias and quality of information.
3. More homogeneous courts will tend to bring up cases in which they agree, and avoid
cases in which they don’t.
Evaluating this argument fully is challenging because we only observe data on cases
which were heard by the court, and thus it is simply not feasible to estimate a model
of case selection. However, we argued that the prior ρ will incorporate both justices’
prior beliefs (about randomly assigned cases) and endogenous case selection. Thus,
to consider this possibility, we plot the estimated prior ρ per state together with
the within-court heterogeneity in the bias estimates (the standard deviation of the
bias estimates within each court). If the hypothesis is true (and if ρ captures case
selection), we should observe a negative relationship: less heterogeneous courts should
have a larger prior ρ, indicating that they are ex ante more favorable to overturning.
The figure suggests that there is no systematic pattern between heterogeneity in the
court (as measured by the standard deviation of the bias estimates within each court)
and case selection (as measured by ρ).
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Table 1: Mandatory and Discretionary Review (source: “State court organization 2004”,
Bureau of Justice Statistics.)
Mandatory and Discretionary Jurisdiction of State Supreme Courts
(1 if mandatory, 0 if mixed, -1 if discretionary)
Electoral System State Criminal 
Appeals
Death Penalty 
Cases
Quality of 
Information
Bias 
(expressive)
Massachusetts 0  - 4.144 0.967
New Hampshire -1 1 3.376 0.802
New Jersey 0 1 3.380 0.873
Rhode Island 1  - 4.030 0.958
Connecticut 0 1 3.482 0.711
Delaware 1 1 3.449 0.666
Hawaii 1  - 3.556 0.713
Maine 1  - 3.609 0.668
New York 1 1 3.757 0.678
South Carolina 1 1 3.540 0.761
Vermont 1  - 3.626 0.698
Virginia -1 1 3.545 0.640
Alaska 1  - 2.874 0.614
Arizona 0 1 2.957 0.727
California -1 1 2.803 0.697
Colorado 0 1 1.638 0.609
Florida 0 1 2.735 0.675
Indiana 0 1 2.879 0.687
Iowa 0  - 2.792 0.603
Kansas 0 1 2.965 0.683
Maryland -1 1 2.719 0.671
Missouri -1 1 2.800 0.704
Nebraska -1 1 2.736 0.614
Oklahoma 1 1 2.730 0.747
South Dakota 1 1 2.921 0.621
Tennessee -1 1 2.603 0.661
Utah 1 1 2.669 0.647
Wyoming 1 1 2.915 0.622
Alabama 1 1 2.448 0.551
Arkansas -1 1 2.673 0.615
Georgia 0 1 2.443 0.686
Idaho 1 1 2.654 0.602
Illinois 0 1 2.854 0.636
Kentucky 0 1 2.309 0.690
Louisiana 0 1 2.242 0.531
Michigan -1  - 2.594 0.489
Minnesota 0  - 2.604 0.601
Mississippi 1 1 2.645 0.658
Montana 1 1 2.806 0.530
Nevada 1 1 2.450 0.696
New Mexico 0 1 2.613 0.594
North Carolina -1 1 2.709 0.718
North Dakota 1  - 2.883 0.545
Ohio 0 1 2.880 0.589
Oregon 0 1 2.554 0.666
Pennsylvania 0 1 2.779 0.635
Texas 0 1 2.348 0.563
Washington -1 1 2.507 0.591
West Virginia -1  - 2.951 0.605
Wisconsin -1  - 2.557 0.533
Appointed, for Life
Appointed, with 
Reappointment
Appointed, with 
Voter Retention
Elected
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Figure 1: Date entered the Union, Bias and Quality of Information
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Figure 2: Spanish Heritage, Bias and Quality of Information
4
0	  
1	  
2	  
3	  
4	  
5	  
6	  
7	  
8	  
9	  
10	  
11	  
Life	   Reappointment	   Voter	  Reten9on	   Elected	  
Discre9onary/Mandatory	  Review	  and	  Electoral	  System	  
Discre9onary	   Mixed	   Mandatory	  
0.400	  
0.500	  
0.600	  
0.700	  
0.800	  
0.900	  
1.000	  
1.500	   2.000	   2.500	   3.000	   3.500	   4.000	   4.500	  
Bi
as
	  
Quality	  of	  Informa1on	  
Quality	  of	  Informa:on	  and	  Bias,	  by	  Type	  of	  Discre:on	  to	  Review	  
Discre:onary	  Review	   Mixed	  Review	   Mandatory	  Review	  
Figure 3: Mandatory and Discretionary Review. Upper Panel plots the number of states
with Discretionary, Mixed, and Mandatory Review for Criminal Appeals, by electoral sys-
tem (source: “State court organization 2004”, Bureau of Justice Statistics.). Lower Panel
plots the estimates of bias and quality of information by type of discretion to review.
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Figure 4: Within-court bias heterogeneity and Case Selection. Larger values of ρ indicates
justices are ex ante more favorable to overturning.
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